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We do not find any consistent evidence that the presence of the largest Brazilian pension 
funds as relevant shareholders is associated to higher corporate governance scores by 
public Brazilian companies. Even though companies with institutional investors as relevant 
shareholders presented a higher average corporate governance score than other 
companies, they were also larger and had greater past profitability than other companies, 
which are common attributes of firms with better corporate governance according to the 
literature. The impact of Brazilian institutional investors on the corporate governance 
quality of their investees is either negligible or cannot be captured by the proxies we 
employed. Finally, we note that these two pension funds may represent the policy and 
political views of the incumbent Brazilian government and that the actions of their board 
appointees may or not reflect what is understood as good corporate governance practices.  




Não encontramos nenhuma comprovação consistente de que a presença dos maiores 
fundos de pensão brasileiros como acionistas importantes está associada a escores de 
maior governança corporativa por parte de empresas brasileiras públicas. Apesar das 
empresas que têm investidores institucionais como acionistas importantes terem 
apresentado um escore de governança corporativa mais elevado do que o de outras 
empresas, elas também são maiores e, no passado, tiveram lucro mais expressivo do que 
outras empresas, o que são atributos comuns de empresas com melhor governança 
corporativa, segundo a literatura. O impacto dos investidores institucionais brasileiros na 
qualidade da governança corporativa de suas participadas é desprezível ou não pode ser 
captado pelos parâmetros que utilizamos. Por fim, observamos que estes dois fundos de 
pensão podem representar a política e as visões políticas do governo brasileiro candidato 
à reeleição e que as ações dos indicados pela junta talvez não reflitam o que é entendido 
como boas práticas de governança. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: investidores institucionais; fundos de pensão; govenança corporativa. 
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Silveira et alli (2009) and Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) examined the 
determinants of good corporate governance practices in Brazilian public companies. The 
presence of institutional investors as relevant shareholders may be one of them. The study 
of institutional investors as monitors of management is a fairly recent theme in Latin 
America. This article analyzes the correlation between the share ownership of the largest 
Brazilian pension funds and a measure of corporate governance quality of Brazilian public 
companies.  
We concentrate on the three largest pension funds in Brazil, Previ, Petros, and 
Funcef, in this order, which also hold the largest relative allocations in equities. The vast 
majority of Brazilian pension funds invest very little in equities. These three pension funds 
are also indirect agents of the Brazilian government because their beneficiaries are the 
employees of Banco do Brasil (the largest Brazilian bank), Petrobras (the Brazilian energy 
giant, one of the largest companies in the world, and the largest in Latin America), and 
Caixa Economica Federal (the second largest Brazilian bank), all controlled by the 
Brazilian federal government. Crisóstomo and González (2006) report that these pension 
funds begin to play a more important role as shareholders during the Brazilian 
privatization process initiated in the 1990s. Their presence in the acquiring consortia made 
several privatizations possible. The agreements that materialized these consortia led them 
to a greater number of board seats and to a more salient role in corporate governance.   
The investments of pension funds represented 15.2 percent of the Brazilian gross 
domestic product. Equity investments accounted for 32.5 percent of the total invested by 
Brazilian pension funds, with the largest ones holding relatively more. In December of 
2010, Previ (US$ 91.7 billion), Petros (US$ 33.4 billion), and Funcef (US$ 26.2 billion) 
jointly represented 46.8 percent of the total investment value of 275 pension funds (US$ 
323.1 billion), as informed by ABRAPP, the Brazilian association that represents company 
sponsored pension funds.  
We do not find any consistently significant correlation between scores of corporate 
governance practices and the presence of institutional investors as relevant shareholders of 
public Brazilian companies, confirming the evidence in Punsuvo et alli (2007), who find a 
negative relationship between the corporate governance practices of Brazilian companies 
and the participation of pension funds as relevant shareholders. Silveira et alli (2008) also 
found a positive but non-significant relationship between pension fund ownership and the 
quality of corporate governance practices. Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) indicate a 
negative impact on the market value and on the dividend yield when an institutional 
investor was the largest ultimate shareholder of a company. This negative relationship is 
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consistent with the findings presented here although it was not always significant. 
Crisóstomo and González (2006) do not find a difference in the performance of Brazilian 
companies with relevant pension fund ownership. Finally, recent preliminary evidence 
presented by Silveira (2011) also concludes that the presence of the largest pension funds 
is not related to better corporate governance practices. 
Pension funds controlled by the government, which are the largest shareholders 
among Brazilian pension funds, may pursue a diverse agenda that includes political issues 
and the economic policy orientation of the incumbent government, and may enroll people 
who are not necessarily committed to better corporate governance practices, but that 
rather have political affinities with the government, as board representatives. Even though 
pension fund officials many times pose as champions of good corporate governance 
practices, we cannot present any solid evidence that ownership by the largest pension 
funds in Brazil translates into better corporate governance practices both from our own 
results and from the literature reviewed. 
 
2 – BACKGROUND 
 
Claessens and Fan (2002) and Gillan and Starks (2003) show that investors are 
willing to pay a premium for the stock of companies that have a more active and 
independent board of directors and that adopt good corporate governance practices. This 
premium is greater in Latin America and Asia and lower in Europe and in the US. A 
growing and important external control mechanism that is affecting corporate governance 
around the world is the presence of institutional investors as shareholders (Aggarwal et alli, 
2011). Sternberg et alli (2011) point out that dilution of corporate control is in progress in 
Brazil, with a growing number of companies with shared control. They highlight the 
increasing importance of shareholder agreements, particularly among those companies 
that went public after 2004. The largest Brazilian pension funds are a frequent signatory of 
such agreements and their size grants them the potential role of monitoring controlling 
shareholders, even when they are not part of an agreement. Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal 
(2006) and Sternberg et alli (2011), among others, on the other hand, assert that control 
still remains very concentrated in Brazil.  
Aggarwal et alli (2011) argue that monitoring by institutional investors based in 
high investor protection countries is more effective and find a positive relationship between 
corporate governance practices and ownership by institutional investors. They also contend 
that monitoring by domestic institutional investors is less effective in low investor protection 
countries. Gillan and Starks (2000) pointed out that the long-term goals of pension fund 
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investments creates an incentive to influence the performance of their investees. Aldrighi 
(2003), on the other hand, emphasized the lack of incentive that institutional investors 
have to exert a more active role in the US because regulation discourages excessive 
control by investors in general, increasing their accountability regarding the performance 
of companies. Gillan and Starks (2000) question the monitoring effectiveness of 
institutional investors because they do not have the expertise needed to advise managers. 
They also observe that institutional investors may be imperfect monitors due to their own 
internal agency problems. However, even the imperfect monitoring provided by 
institutional investors may be welcome by minority shareholders in low investor protection 
countries.   
Gillan and Starks (2003) underline differences in the monitoring incentives and 
skills between institutional and major non-institutional shareholders. The incentive to 
monitor and maintain efficiency may vary among institutional investors as well. They may 
be pressure-sensitive, such as banks and insurance companies, or insensitive to pressure, 
such as mutual funds and pension funds. Pressure sensitive investors are those that have a 
business relationship, potential or current, with the companies in which they invest. They 
may be less active in monitoring these companies and friendlier to managers than those 
that are insensitive to pressure. Gillan and Starks (2003) note that even though banks 
could have a comparative monitoring advantage due to their access to company 
information, they typically hold larger debt than equity stakes in the company and, 
therefore, their ability to monitor in the interest of minority shareholders may be clouded by 
those issues. These authors also call attention to a considerable difference in the role of 
banks as shareholders in countries such as Germany and Japan in relation to the US and 
the UK.  
Large institutional investors may convey reliable information to other investors and 
have several ways of influencing the governance of a company. They may establish 
policies on executive compensation, participate in the board of directors, sell their shares 
rather than trying to instigate changes, or express their opinions aggressively by means of 
press or media campaigns when their suggestions are not accepted by the company. Becht 
et alli (2003) remind that holding a seat at the board of directors is, however, naturally 
limited by laws and regulations, which vary considerably across countries. They also note 
that the actions and the sizable stakes of institutional investors may affect the liquidity and 
the value of their shares. Gillan and Starks (2003) recount that the presence of institutional 
investors leads to more informative prices and, consequently, to lower monitoring costs. 
They observed that institutional investors have historically favored liquidity because their 
ability to monitor management may imply in being subject to less liquidity. This cost may 
be unacceptable for many institutional investors.  
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Becht et alli (2003) state that there are many difficulties to measure the 
effectiveness of the monitoring actions of institutional investors and to separate the effect of 
monitoring from other events, such as changes in the economy, in the market or in 
management, which is hard to observe. Institutional investors may also collude with 
management. These difficulties led to ambiguous empirical results. Seifert et alli (2005), 
for instance, found no conclusive results about the impact of the presence of institutional 
investors as shareholders in companies in the US, Japan, Germany, and the UK. Becht et 
alli (2003) report that there is little evidence that the presence of institutional investors is 
related to improvements in company operational performance.  
 
3 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
We elected to use the three largest pension funds in Brazil in our study of 
institutional investors. Previc, the National Complementary Social Security Authority, under 
the Ministry of Social Security, supervises Brazilian pension funds. Pension funds are 
subject to prudential constraints in their asset allocation, such as equities not exceeding 70 
percent of their portfolio (this ceiling was 50 percent before 2009). Crisóstomo and 
González (2006) point out that pension funds adopted policies that encourage more 
activism, such as attendance to general shareholder meetings, exercise of voting rights, 
board membership, and closer supervision of investee management.  
Previ is over 100 years old and the largest pension fund of Latin America. It 
published a code of best corporate governance practices that sets guidelines regarding 
transparency, accountability, shareholder rights, and business ethics. The code guides its 
investment decisions and outlines what the Previ expects from company management. 
Previ has historically favored investments in equity, contrasting with most Brazilian pension 
funds. Our calculations from data available at their website indicated equity investments of 
about 62 percent of their total investments in June 2011. Petros is the second largest 
Brazilian pension fund in both investment asset value and number of participants. Like 
Previ, it produced a corporate governance code that guides its investment decisions. Petros 
has been much more conservative than Previ regarding its equity investments. Its Annual 
Report for 2010 showed a 33.8 percent share of equities relative to total investments, 
which, in any case, is much more than most pension funds. Finally, Funcef informed on 
their website that 36.1 percent of their total investments was in equities.  
We obtained the firm-level corporate governance scores of public Brazilian 
companies computed by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) for 1998, 2000 and 2002. 
The scores of this Corporate Governance Index (CGI) were obtained through objective 
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answers to a questionnaire comprised of 24 questions. The objective was to obtain yes or 
no answers to questions that could be answered from publicly available information in 
order to have the largest possible sample and to avoid subjectivity. The questionnaire is 
based on the Brazilian codes of good corporate governance practices produced by the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) and the Brazilian Securities 
Commission (CVM). An affirmative answer was recorded with a unit score and a negative 
answer with a null score. An affirmative answer denotes the presence of a good corporate 
governance practice. Naturally, a limitation of such device is that the presence of some 
corporate governance practices cannot be detected from publicly available information 
and no judgment can be made about the quality of the practices that the company reports. 
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) present the complete questionnaire and more details.  
The index is divided into four sub-indices, each one comprised of six questions 
representing a dimension of corporate governance practices. The Disclosure dimension 
deals with transactions with related parties, compensation, charter sanctions for violations 
of corporate governance principles, auditors, and the adoption of international accounting 
practices. The Board Composition and Functioning dimension addresses the number and 
type of board members, the separation of chair and CEO positions, the use of committees, 
and the tenure of board members. The Ethics and Conflicts of Interest dimension considers 
inquiries and convictions by the authorities, the use of arbitration for dispute resolution, the 
presence of controlling shareholders, the percentage of non-voting shares, and deviations 
between control and cash flow rights. Finally, the Shareholder Rights dimension 
concentrates on easing the requirements to vote in general assemblies, granting voting 
rights to non-voting shares in relevant issues, conferring mandatory bid rights in control 
transfer transaction beyond the legal requirements, minimum liquidity requirements, and 
the presence of indirect control structures and shareholder agreements.  
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) present statistics for the CGI scores and its sub-
indices. There was an increase in the average score from 1998 to 2002. They also show 
that good corporate governance practices are related to greater market valuations, of 
around 7 percent for each one point in the CGI score for the average leverage company. 
Silveira et alli (2009) show that scores have been increasing as well as dispersion. The 
market seems to have evolved into two different categories. Companies listed for a long 
time that have not improved their corporate governance practices much and companies 
that listed more recently in the more demanding premium listing segments of the Brazilian 
stock exchange.  
We collected percentage equity holdings of Previ, Petros, and Funcef in the 
companies listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) in 1998, 2000 and 2002, 
the same years for which we had the CGI scores. The Brazilian law mandates that 
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shareholders disclose ownership of five percent or more in the equity capital, voting or not. 
Only direct ownership rights were considered. For each relevant stake identified, we 
collected the percentage of voting and of all shares held by the three pension funds. The 
InfoIinvest database was the source for this data as it contains the annual legal filings of 
companies. We also used a dummy variable to identify whether the controlling 
shareholder of the company is an institutional investor, of any kind, and other dummies to 
indicate if Previ or Petros have a relevant equity stake. Table 1 shows the definitions of all 
variables. A number of control variables have been included, as employed by Leal and 
Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Silveira et alli (2009).  
 
 
Table 1 - Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description 
CGI The score in the CGI (Corporate Governance Index) of a company, as described in Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) 
CGI-1 Disclosure portion of the CGI score 
CGI-2 Board composition and functioning portion of the CGI score 
CGI-3 Ethics and conflicts of interest portion of the CGI score 
CGI-4 Shareholders Rights portion of the CGI score 
INST Dummy variable indicating whether the largest shareholder is an institutional investor (1), regardless if it is one of the three pension funds analyzed  
Previ Dummy variable indicating whether Previ has relevant (greater or equal to 5 percent) equity participation 
Previ% Percentage of all company shares belonging to Previ 
Petros Dummy variable indicating whether Petros has relevant (greater or equal to 5 percent) equity participation 
NM 
Dummy variable indicating whether the company is listed in one of the 
premium listing levels (New Market) created by Bovespa in 2000, those levels 
require increasing demands from companies in terms of corporate 
governance practices, shareholder rights, and transparency. More details in 
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Silveira et alli (2009). This variable 
is present only for 2002 
AGR Dummy variable indicating the existence of a shareholders agreement (1) 
Growth Percentage growth in sales over the three preceding years 
ROA Return on assets, measured as earnings before interest and tax over total assets 
Size Natural logarithm of the book equity value 
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the relevant equity holdings of the three 
pension funds. The first fact that stands out is the limited relevant ownership of Funcef. 
Consequently, in the ensuing analysis we did not include Funcef. Previ, on the other hand, 
is a relevant shareholder in one out of every six or seven companies in the sample, with a 
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median voting stake of 10.3 percent and a median total capital stake of 8.5 percent. This 
suggests that it may be the most influential of the three largest pension funds. Petros is 
situated somewhere between Funcef and Previ, with relevant equity ownership in one out of 
every 40 companies in the sample, with a six percent of the voting and 3.2 percent 
median of the total equity capital.  
 
 
Table 2 - Number of companies with relevant equity stakes from selected pension funds 
  














         Previ                 
As controlling 










Total 34 14.17%   33 13.98%   34 15.89% 
         Petros                 
As controlling 










Total 7 2.92%   5 2.12%   5 2.34% 
         Funcef                 
As controlling 










Total 0 0.00%   1 0.42%   3 1.40% 
         No. companies in 
sample 240 100%   236 100%   214 100% 




Table 3 - Relative share ownership of pension funds 
  
  Voting Capital   Total Capital 
 Year Max Min Mean Median   Max Min Mean Median 
          Previ                   
1998 55.6% 0.0% 13.4% 10.1% 
 
50.4% 1.5% 12.1% 9.5% 
2000 55.5% 0.0% 13.1% 10.0% 
 
50.3% 1.5% 10.7% 8.0% 
2002 55.5% 0.0% 13.3% 10.3%   50.3% 2.3% 11.7% 8.5% 
          Petros                   
1998 16.8% 3.6% 10.5% 12.8% 
 
11.1% 2.1% 6.4% 7.3% 
2000 14.6% 3.6% 8.5% 6.0% 
 
9.5% 2.1% 5.1% 3.3% 
2002 14.6% 3.6% 8.5% 6.0%   9.5% 2.1% 5.2% 3.2% 
          Funcef                   
1998 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2000 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 
2002 6.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0%   9.3% 2.5% 5.6% 5.1% 
Source: InfoInvest and own calculations 
 
We proceeded to analyze an initial regression model of the CGI and its sub-indices 
as the dependent variables, considering the other variables as potential correlates. Table 4 
shows an analysis of the bivariate correlations between all right-hand side variables. All 
significant correlations are positive. The results in Table 4 indicate that company size is 
correlated with the ROA and with the shareholders agreement, premium listing, and Previ 
dummies, which is also correlated with the ROA and the Petros dummy. The Petros dummy 
is correlated with the shareholders agreement and the relevant institutional investor 
shareholding dummies as well. Finally, the shareholders agreement dummy is correlated 
with the premium-listing dummy. Thus, several right-hand side variables are significantly 
correlated, which is a problem for multivariate linear regression models.  
Regarding the dependent, left-hand side variables, naturally there are many positive 
and significant correlations between the CGI scores and its partial scores, represented by 
its four sub-indices. Once again, the significant correlations reported in Table 4 are all 
positive. The shareholders agreement dummy is correlated with the CGI and three of the 
four sub-indices. The ROA, company size, and the Previ, Petros, and premium listing 
dummies are also correlated with the CGI and to some of the sub-indices.  
The correlation analysis suggests that corporate governance practices are better in 
larger companies, which also tend to be the ones with larger ROA. Previ and Petros tend 
to be present as relevant shareholders in larger and better-governed companies. Self-
selection problems may be important in the analysis of the potential influence of the large 




Table 4 - Correlation between variables 
 
N Variable Year AGR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Growth 
1998 0.07                       
2000 0.10                       
2002 -0.03                       
2 ROA 
1998 0.04 0.00                     
2000 0.05 0.04                     
2002 -0.06 -0.04                     
3 Size 
1998 0.14 0.15 0.22                   
2000 0.18 0.12 0.28                   
2002 0.18 0.08 0.23                   
4 CGI-1 
1998 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.46                 
2000 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.53                 
2002 0.18 -0.04 0.26 0.53                 
5 CGI-2 
1998 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.30 0.23               
2000 0.18 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.24               
2002 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.41 0.34               
6 CGI-3 
1998 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.09             
2000 0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.13             
2002 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.19             
7 CGI-4 
1998 0.58 -0.05 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.09 -0.08           
2000 0.56 0.15 -0.04 0.19 0.22 0.14 -0.03           
2002 0.57 0.06 -0.02 0.23 0.27 0.23 -0.04           
8 CGI 
1998 0.37 0.03 0.20 0.48 0.63 0.70 0.36 0.54         
2000 0.42 0.12 0.15 0.48 0.59 0.74 0.38 0.56         
2002 0.40 0.04 0.18 0.52 0.66 0.78 0.40 0.60         
9 Previ 
1998 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.12 -0.03 0.16 0.18       
2000 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.16 0.08 -0.03 0.17 0.17       
2002 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.18       
10 Petros 
1998 0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.19 0.08 -0.05 0.16 0.17 0.43     
2000 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.15 0.36     
2002 0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.00 -0.10 0.14 0.08 0.36     
11 INST 
1998 0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.09 0.13   
2000 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.08 -0.05 0.17 0.10 0.17   
2002 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.07 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.17   
12 NM 
1998 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2002 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.34 0.32 0.22 0.01 0.34 0.37 0.11 0.02 0.01 
Source: InfoInvest, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and own calculations. All variables were defined in 





Petros is present in a few companies as a relevant shareholder and its dummy is 
highly correlated with the Previ dummy. By and large, its relevant shareholdings were a 
subset of those of Previ. Thus, the analysis of Table 5 considered only the presence of Previ 
as a relevant shareholder. It also considers if an institutional investor is the largest 
shareholder. Table 5 shows the differences in means in the scores of the CGI and its sub-
indices. The statistics reported in Table 5 refer only to 2002. The results for 1998 and 
2000 are the same in terms of significance and are available upon request.  
 
Table 5 - Average corporate governance scores according to institutional investor shareholding in 
2002 
  







CGI No 180 10.2 1.31 
 Yes 34 11.5  
CGI-1 Disclosure No 180 3.7 0.67 
 Yes 34 4.4  
CGI-2 Board Composition and 
Functioning 
No 180 2.2 0.17 
 Yes 34 2.3  
CGI-3 Ethics and Conflicts of Interest No 180 2.6 -0.03 
 Yes 34 2.5  
CGI-4 Shareholder Rights No 180 1.8 0.50 
 Yes 34 2.3  









CGI No 195 10.3 1.12 
 Yes 19 11.4  
CGI-1 Disclosure No 195 3.8 0.20 
 Yes 19 4.0  
CGI-2 Board Composition and 
Functioning 
No 195 2.1 0.84 
 Yes 19 2.9  
CGI-3 Ethics and Conflicts of Interest No 195 2.5 0.20 
 Yes 19 2.0  
CGI-4 Shareholder Rights No 195 1.9 -0.12 
 Yes 19 1.7  
Source: InfoInvest, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and own calculations. All variables were defined in 
Table 1. Figures in bold are significant at the five percent level.   
 
The results in Table 5 suggest that the average corporate governance scores of the 
companies with a relevant participation of Previ and of those that have an institutional 
shareholder as their largest investor are significantly higher. The same is true for the 
Disclosure and Shareholder Rights sub-indices, but not for the Board Composition and 
Functioning and the Ethics and Conflict of Interest sub-indices. Thus, if present, the impact 
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of relevant shareholding by large institutional investors is not uniform across all corporate 
governance dimensions. It may well be that institutional investors may have no impact at 
all, and that they may simply select companies that are larger, more liquid, and with better 
past profitability, which also present a positive correlation with the corporate governance 
scores. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that institutional investors do not seem to 
select companies that score higher in board composition and functioning and that better 
address potential for conflicts of interest. 
Table 6 presents the results of our regression models for 2002, even though the 
correlation results reported above render them unreliable. The results for 1998 and 2000 
are qualitatively the same and are available upon request. The coefficients for the Previ 
dummy are not significant and their signs are not consistent across all corporate 
governance scores used as dependent variables. The same occurs for the dummy of an 
institutional investor as the largest shareholder. The coefficient for the percent share of 
Previ in the equity capital of companies is not significant as well. There is no evidence from 
Table 6 that suggests that an additional causality analysis should be performed for 
institutional ownership. Thus, we do not provide any additional tests to account for self-
selection and endogeneity. The significant results for some of the control variables, such as 
size, the ROA, and the shareholders agreement and premium listing dummies are 
consistent with those found by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Silveira et alli 
(2009). The positive coefficients for the shareholders agreement dummy is not surprising 
given that Sternberg et alli (2011) indicated that they are more common among 
companies listed in the premium lists because they have more dispersed ownership.  
 


















Constant 2.04 0.39 -1.56 2.14 1.07 1.93 2.09 0.29 -1.33 2.20 0.94 
Previ 0.15 0.27 -0.27 -0.08 0.22 – – – – – – 
Previ% – – – – – -0.01 – – – – – 
INST – – – – – – 0.55 -0.03 0.64 0.17 -0.22 
Size 0.54 0.23 0.25 0.03 0.03 0.54 0.53 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.04 
ROA 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AGR 1.97 0.20 0.34 0.09 1.34 2.01 1.97 0.22 0.31 0.08 1.37 
NM 1.49 0.47 0.32 -0.02 0.71 1.49 1.50 0.48 0.32 -0.02 0.72 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.33 0.18 -0.02 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.33 0.20 -0.02 0.39 
Source: InfoInvest, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and own calculations. The dependent variables are in 
the top row and the "explanatory" variables in the first column. All variables were defined in Table 1. Figures 




4 – FINAL REMARKS 
 
Our results are consistent with those of Punsuvo et alli (2007) and Silveira et alli 
(2008), among others that have examined the impact of shareholding by institutional 
investors on corporate governance practices in Brazil. We provide no evidence of a 
potential impact of these investors in general, and of the two largest Brazilian pension 
funds, Previ and Petros, in particular, on the corporate governance scores of the 
companies they invest. We also detected that institutional investors do not seem to select 
companies that score higher in board composition and functioning and that address 
potential for conflicts of interest better. 
A number of things could be happening. First of all, our corporate governance 
scores may not be refined enough to capture the influence of these investors or, 
alternatively, their influence is only felt over a longer time frame. Our corporate 
governance scores capture the presence or absence of certain practices that are reported 
in public documents and, thus, cannot ascertain many aspects of the quality of the 
corporate governance practices of a company, nor can it say anything about the quality of 
the practices it detects. Our scores, however, are highly correlated with listing in Bovespa 
premium listing segments and with company size. It is reasonable to expect that larger 
companies would have the means and incentives to pursue better corporate governance 
practices. 
On the other hand, it is quite possible that Previ and Petros prefer to have their 
more relevant shareholdings in companies that are larger and that showed higher past 
profitability, which also happen to be the ones with greater corporate governance scores. 
Thus, it could well be that all of these variables are endogenous and that Previ and Petros, 
as well as other institutional investors, regard liquidity as a key characteristic their investees 
should have. Finally, it is quite possible that these two very large pension funds represent 
the interests of the incumbent Brazilian government regarding its economic policies and 
political views. Those appointed to represent Previ and Petros at company boards may be 
committed to these political and economic directives, which may or may not be consistent 
with corporate governance practices commonly regarded as good. If this is the case, then 
the impact of any relevant shareholding of these pension funds could have on the quality 
of the corporate governance of their investee firms might not be detected. It is certain that 
more research is needed about this topic, but so far the literature has not identified any 
consistent results about the positive impact of the larger Brazilian pension funds on the 
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LARGE PENSION FUNDS AND THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES OF BRAZILIAN COMPANIES 
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We do not find any consistent evidence that the presence of the largest Brazilian pension 
funds as relevant shareholders is associated to higher corporate governance scores by 
public Brazilian companies. Even though companies with institutional investors as relevant 
shareholders presented a higher average corporate governance score than other 
companies, they were also larger and had greater past profitability than other companies, 
which are common attributes of firms with better corporate governance according to the 
literature. The impact of Brazilian institutional investors on the corporate governance 
quality of their investees is either negligible or cannot be captured by the proxies we 
employed. Finally, we note that these two pension funds may represent the policy and 
political views of the incumbent Brazilian government and that the actions of their board 
appointees may or not reflect what is understood as good corporate governance practices.  




Não encontramos nenhuma comprovação consistente de que a presença dos maiores 
fundos de pensão brasileiros como acionistas importantes está associada a escores de 
maior governança corporativa por parte de empresas brasileiras públicas. Apesar das 
empresas que têm investidores institucionais como acionistas importantes terem 
apresentado um escore de governança corporativa mais elevado do que o de outras 
empresas, elas também são maiores e, no passado, tiveram lucro mais expressivo do que 
outras empresas, o que são atributos comuns de empresas com melhor governança 
corporativa, segundo a literatura. O impacto dos investidores institucionais brasileiros na 
qualidade da governança corporativa de suas participadas é desprezível ou não pode ser 
captado pelos parâmetros que utilizamos. Por fim, observamos que estes dois fundos de 
pensão podem representar a política e as visões políticas do governo brasileiro candidato 
à reeleição e que as ações dos indicados pela junta talvez não reflitam o que é entendido 
como boas práticas de governança. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: investidores institucionais; fundos de pensão; govenança corporativa. 
                                                     
1 Promon Novos Negócios, Rio de Janeiro RJ Brazil, rodrigooliveira200@yahoo.com.br 
2 Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro RJ Brazil, rleal@ufrj.br 
3
 Corresponding author and Assistant Professor of Finance at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte 
(UFRN), UFRN/PPGA, R. Salgado Filho, 3000, Lagoa Nova, Natal, RN, 59072-970, Brazil (Tel. +55 84 
3342-2521, e-mail: almeida.vinicio@gmail.com). 
3 
 
1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Silveira et alli (2009) and Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) examined the 
determinants of good corporate governance practices in Brazilian public companies. The 
presence of institutional investors as relevant shareholders may be one of them. The study 
of institutional investors as monitors of management is a fairly recent theme in Latin 
America. This article analyzes the correlation between the share ownership of the largest 
Brazilian pension funds and a measure of corporate governance quality of Brazilian public 
companies.  
We concentrate on the three largest pension funds in Brazil, Previ, Petros, and 
Funcef, in this order, which also hold the largest relative allocations in equities. The vast 
majority of Brazilian pension funds invest very little in equities. These three pension funds 
are also indirect agents of the Brazilian government because their beneficiaries are the 
employees of Banco do Brasil (the largest Brazilian bank), Petrobras (the Brazilian energy 
giant, one of the largest companies in the world, and the largest in Latin America), and 
Caixa Economica Federal (the second largest Brazilian bank), all controlled by the 
Brazilian federal government. Crisóstomo and González (2006) report that these pension 
funds begin to play a more important role as shareholders during the Brazilian 
privatization process initiated in the 1990s. Their presence in the acquiring consortia made 
several privatizations possible. The agreements that materialized these consortia led them 
to a greater number of board seats and to a more salient role in corporate governance.   
The investments of pension funds represented 15.2 percent of the Brazilian gross 
domestic product. Equity investments accounted for 32.5 percent of the total invested by 
Brazilian pension funds, with the largest ones holding relatively more. In December of 
2010, Previ (US$ 91.7 billion), Petros (US$ 33.4 billion), and Funcef (US$ 26.2 billion) 
jointly represented 46.8 percent of the total investment value of 275 pension funds (US$ 
323.1 billion), as informed by ABRAPP, the Brazilian association that represents company 
sponsored pension funds.  
We do not find any consistently significant correlation between scores of corporate 
governance practices and the presence of institutional investors as relevant shareholders of 
public Brazilian companies, confirming the evidence in Punsuvo et alli (2007), who find a 
negative relationship between the corporate governance practices of Brazilian companies 
and the participation of pension funds as relevant shareholders. Silveira et alli (2008) also 
found a positive but non-significant relationship between pension fund ownership and the 
quality of corporate governance practices. Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) indicate a 
negative impact on the market value and on the dividend yield when an institutional 
investor was the largest ultimate shareholder of a company. This negative relationship is 
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consistent with the findings presented here although it was not always significant. 
Crisóstomo and González (2006) do not find a difference in the performance of Brazilian 
companies with relevant pension fund ownership. Finally, recent preliminary evidence 
presented by Silveira (2011) also concludes that the presence of the largest pension funds 
is not related to better corporate governance practices. 
Pension funds controlled by the government, which are the largest shareholders 
among Brazilian pension funds, may pursue a diverse agenda that includes political issues 
and the economic policy orientation of the incumbent government, and may enroll people 
who are not necessarily committed to better corporate governance practices, but that 
rather have political affinities with the government, as board representatives. Even though 
pension fund officials many times pose as champions of good corporate governance 
practices, we cannot present any solid evidence that ownership by the largest pension 
funds in Brazil translates into better corporate governance practices both from our own 
results and from the literature reviewed. 
 
2 – BACKGROUND 
 
Claessens and Fan (2002) and Gillan and Starks (2003) show that investors are 
willing to pay a premium for the stock of companies that have a more active and 
independent board of directors and that adopt good corporate governance practices. This 
premium is greater in Latin America and Asia and lower in Europe and in the US. A 
growing and important external control mechanism that is affecting corporate governance 
around the world is the presence of institutional investors as shareholders (Aggarwal et alli, 
2011). Sternberg et alli (2011) point out that dilution of corporate control is in progress in 
Brazil, with a growing number of companies with shared control. They highlight the 
increasing importance of shareholder agreements, particularly among those companies 
that went public after 2004. The largest Brazilian pension funds are a frequent signatory of 
such agreements and their size grants them the potential role of monitoring controlling 
shareholders, even when they are not part of an agreement. Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal 
(2006) and Sternberg et alli (2011), among others, on the other hand, assert that control 
still remains very concentrated in Brazil.  
Aggarwal et alli (2011) argue that monitoring by institutional investors based in 
high investor protection countries is more effective and find a positive relationship between 
corporate governance practices and ownership by institutional investors. They also contend 
that monitoring by domestic institutional investors is less effective in low investor protection 
countries. Gillan and Starks (2000) pointed out that the long-term goals of pension fund 
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investments creates an incentive to influence the performance of their investees. Aldrighi 
(2003), on the other hand, emphasized the lack of incentive that institutional investors 
have to exert a more active role in the US because regulation discourages excessive 
control by investors in general, increasing their accountability regarding the performance 
of companies. Gillan and Starks (2000) question the monitoring effectiveness of 
institutional investors because they do not have the expertise needed to advise managers. 
They also observe that institutional investors may be imperfect monitors due to their own 
internal agency problems. However, even the imperfect monitoring provided by 
institutional investors may be welcome by minority shareholders in low investor protection 
countries.   
Gillan and Starks (2003) underline differences in the monitoring incentives and 
skills between institutional and major non-institutional shareholders. The incentive to 
monitor and maintain efficiency may vary among institutional investors as well. They may 
be pressure-sensitive, such as banks and insurance companies, or insensitive to pressure, 
such as mutual funds and pension funds. Pressure sensitive investors are those that have a 
business relationship, potential or current, with the companies in which they invest. They 
may be less active in monitoring these companies and friendlier to managers than those 
that are insensitive to pressure. Gillan and Starks (2003) note that even though banks 
could have a comparative monitoring advantage due to their access to company 
information, they typically hold larger debt than equity stakes in the company and, 
therefore, their ability to monitor in the interest of minority shareholders may be clouded by 
those issues. These authors also call attention to a considerable difference in the role of 
banks as shareholders in countries such as Germany and Japan in relation to the US and 
the UK.  
Large institutional investors may convey reliable information to other investors and 
have several ways of influencing the governance of a company. They may establish 
policies on executive compensation, participate in the board of directors, sell their shares 
rather than trying to instigate changes, or express their opinions aggressively by means of 
press or media campaigns when their suggestions are not accepted by the company. Becht 
et alli (2003) remind that holding a seat at the board of directors is, however, naturally 
limited by laws and regulations, which vary considerably across countries. They also note 
that the actions and the sizable stakes of institutional investors may affect the liquidity and 
the value of their shares. Gillan and Starks (2003) recount that the presence of institutional 
investors leads to more informative prices and, consequently, to lower monitoring costs. 
They observed that institutional investors have historically favored liquidity because their 
ability to monitor management may imply in being subject to less liquidity. This cost may 
be unacceptable for many institutional investors.  
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Becht et alli (2003) state that there are many difficulties to measure the 
effectiveness of the monitoring actions of institutional investors and to separate the effect of 
monitoring from other events, such as changes in the economy, in the market or in 
management, which is hard to observe. Institutional investors may also collude with 
management. These difficulties led to ambiguous empirical results. Seifert et alli (2005), 
for instance, found no conclusive results about the impact of the presence of institutional 
investors as shareholders in companies in the US, Japan, Germany, and the UK. Becht et 
alli (2003) report that there is little evidence that the presence of institutional investors is 
related to improvements in company operational performance.  
 
3 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
We elected to use the three largest pension funds in Brazil in our study of 
institutional investors. Previc, the National Complementary Social Security Authority, under 
the Ministry of Social Security, supervises Brazilian pension funds. Pension funds are 
subject to prudential constraints in their asset allocation, such as equities not exceeding 70 
percent of their portfolio (this ceiling was 50 percent before 2009). Crisóstomo and 
González (2006) point out that pension funds adopted policies that encourage more 
activism, such as attendance to general shareholder meetings, exercise of voting rights, 
board membership, and closer supervision of investee management.  
Previ is over 100 years old and the largest pension fund of Latin America. It 
published a code of best corporate governance practices that sets guidelines regarding 
transparency, accountability, shareholder rights, and business ethics. The code guides its 
investment decisions and outlines what the Previ expects from company management. 
Previ has historically favored investments in equity, contrasting with most Brazilian pension 
funds. Our calculations from data available at their website indicated equity investments of 
about 62 percent of their total investments in June 2011. Petros is the second largest 
Brazilian pension fund in both investment asset value and number of participants. Like 
Previ, it produced a corporate governance code that guides its investment decisions. Petros 
has been much more conservative than Previ regarding its equity investments. Its Annual 
Report for 2010 showed a 33.8 percent share of equities relative to total investments, 
which, in any case, is much more than most pension funds. Finally, Funcef informed on 
their website that 36.1 percent of their total investments was in equities.  
We obtained the firm-level corporate governance scores of public Brazilian 
companies computed by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) for 1998, 2000 and 2002. 
The scores of this Corporate Governance Index (CGI) were obtained through objective 
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answers to a questionnaire comprised of 24 questions. The objective was to obtain yes or 
no answers to questions that could be answered from publicly available information in 
order to have the largest possible sample and to avoid subjectivity. The questionnaire is 
based on the Brazilian codes of good corporate governance practices produced by the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) and the Brazilian Securities 
Commission (CVM). An affirmative answer was recorded with a unit score and a negative 
answer with a null score. An affirmative answer denotes the presence of a good corporate 
governance practice. Naturally, a limitation of such device is that the presence of some 
corporate governance practices cannot be detected from publicly available information 
and no judgment can be made about the quality of the practices that the company reports. 
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) present the complete questionnaire and more details.  
The index is divided into four sub-indices, each one comprised of six questions 
representing a dimension of corporate governance practices. The Disclosure dimension 
deals with transactions with related parties, compensation, charter sanctions for violations 
of corporate governance principles, auditors, and the adoption of international accounting 
practices. The Board Composition and Functioning dimension addresses the number and 
type of board members, the separation of chair and CEO positions, the use of committees, 
and the tenure of board members. The Ethics and Conflicts of Interest dimension considers 
inquiries and convictions by the authorities, the use of arbitration for dispute resolution, the 
presence of controlling shareholders, the percentage of non-voting shares, and deviations 
between control and cash flow rights. Finally, the Shareholder Rights dimension 
concentrates on easing the requirements to vote in general assemblies, granting voting 
rights to non-voting shares in relevant issues, conferring mandatory bid rights in control 
transfer transaction beyond the legal requirements, minimum liquidity requirements, and 
the presence of indirect control structures and shareholder agreements.  
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) present statistics for the CGI scores and its sub-
indices. There was an increase in the average score from 1998 to 2002. They also show 
that good corporate governance practices are related to greater market valuations, of 
around 7 percent for each one point in the CGI score for the average leverage company. 
Silveira et alli (2009) show that scores have been increasing as well as dispersion. The 
market seems to have evolved into two different categories. Companies listed for a long 
time that have not improved their corporate governance practices much and companies 
that listed more recently in the more demanding premium listing segments of the Brazilian 
stock exchange.  
We collected percentage equity holdings of Previ, Petros, and Funcef in the 
companies listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) in 1998, 2000 and 2002, 
the same years for which we had the CGI scores. The Brazilian law mandates that 
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shareholders disclose ownership of five percent or more in the equity capital, voting or not. 
Only direct ownership rights were considered. For each relevant stake identified, we 
collected the percentage of voting and of all shares held by the three pension funds. The 
InfoIinvest database was the source for this data as it contains the annual legal filings of 
companies. We also used a dummy variable to identify whether the controlling 
shareholder of the company is an institutional investor, of any kind, and other dummies to 
indicate if Previ or Petros have a relevant equity stake. Table 1 shows the definitions of all 
variables. A number of control variables have been included, as employed by Leal and 
Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Silveira et alli (2009).  
 
 




The score in the CGI (Corporate Governance Index) of a company, as 
described in Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) 
CGI-1 Disclosure portion of the CGI score 
CGI-2 Board composition and functioning portion of the CGI score 
CGI-3 Ethics and conflicts of interest portion of the CGI score 
CGI-4 Shareholders Rights portion of the CGI score 
INST 
Dummy variable indicating whether the largest shareholder is an institutional 
investor (1), regardless if it is one of the three pension funds analyzed  
Previ 
Dummy variable indicating whether Previ has relevant (greater or equal to 5 
percent) equity participation 
Previ% Percentage of all company shares belonging to Previ 
Petros 
Dummy variable indicating whether Petros has relevant (greater or equal to 5 
percent) equity participation 
NM 
Dummy variable indicating whether the company is listed in one of the 
premium listing levels (New Market) created by Bovespa in 2000, those levels 
require increasing demands from companies in terms of corporate 
governance practices, shareholder rights, and transparency. More details in 
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Silveira et alli (2009). This variable 
is present only for 2002 
AGR Dummy variable indicating the existence of a shareholders agreement (1) 
Growth Percentage growth in sales over the three preceding years 
ROA 
Return on assets, measured as earnings before interest and tax over total 
assets 
Size Natural logarithm of the book equity value 
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the relevant equity holdings of the three 
pension funds. The first fact that stands out is the limited relevant ownership of Funcef. 
Consequently, in the ensuing analysis we did not include Funcef. Previ, on the other hand, 
is a relevant shareholder in one out of every six or seven companies in the sample, with a 
9 
 
median voting stake of 10.3 percent and a median total capital stake of 8.5 percent. This 
suggests that it may be the most influential of the three largest pension funds. Petros is 
situated somewhere between Funcef and Previ, with relevant equity ownership in one out of 
every 40 companies in the sample, with a six percent of the voting and 3.2 percent 
median of the total equity capital.  
 
 
Table 2 - Number of companies with relevant equity stakes from selected pension funds 
  














         Previ                 
As controlling 










Total 34 14.17%   33 13.98%   34 15.89% 
         Petros                 
As controlling 










Total 7 2.92%   5 2.12%   5 2.34% 
         Funcef                 
As controlling 










Total 0 0.00%   1 0.42%   3 1.40% 
         No. companies in 
sample 240 100%   236 100%   214 100% 




Table 3 - Relative share ownership of pension funds 
  
  Voting Capital   Total Capital 
 Year Max Min Mean Median   Max Min Mean Median 
          Previ                   
1998 55.6% 0.0% 13.4% 10.1% 
 
50.4% 1.5% 12.1% 9.5% 
2000 55.5% 0.0% 13.1% 10.0% 
 
50.3% 1.5% 10.7% 8.0% 
2002 55.5% 0.0% 13.3% 10.3%   50.3% 2.3% 11.7% 8.5% 
          Petros                   
1998 16.8% 3.6% 10.5% 12.8% 
 
11.1% 2.1% 6.4% 7.3% 
2000 14.6% 3.6% 8.5% 6.0% 
 
9.5% 2.1% 5.1% 3.3% 
2002 14.6% 3.6% 8.5% 6.0%   9.5% 2.1% 5.2% 3.2% 
          Funcef                   
1998 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2000 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 
2002 6.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0%   9.3% 2.5% 5.6% 5.1% 
Source: InfoInvest and own calculations 
 
We proceeded to analyze an initial regression model of the CGI and its sub-indices 
as the dependent variables, considering the other variables as potential correlates. Table 4 
shows an analysis of the bivariate correlations between all right-hand side variables. All 
significant correlations are positive. The results in Table 4 indicate that company size is 
correlated with the ROA and with the shareholders agreement, premium listing, and Previ 
dummies, which is also correlated with the ROA and the Petros dummy. The Petros dummy 
is correlated with the shareholders agreement and the relevant institutional investor 
shareholding dummies as well. Finally, the shareholders agreement dummy is correlated 
with the premium-listing dummy. Thus, several right-hand side variables are significantly 
correlated, which is a problem for multivariate linear regression models.  
Regarding the dependent, left-hand side variables, naturally there are many positive 
and significant correlations between the CGI scores and its partial scores, represented by 
its four sub-indices. Once again, the significant correlations reported in Table 4 are all 
positive. The shareholders agreement dummy is correlated with the CGI and three of the 
four sub-indices. The ROA, company size, and the Previ, Petros, and premium listing 
dummies are also correlated with the CGI and to some of the sub-indices.  
The correlation analysis suggests that corporate governance practices are better in 
larger companies, which also tend to be the ones with larger ROA. Previ and Petros tend 
to be present as relevant shareholders in larger and better-governed companies. Self-
selection problems may be important in the analysis of the potential influence of the large 




Table 4 - Correlation between variables 
 
N Variable Year AGR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Growth 
1998 0.07                       
2000 0.10                       
2002 -0.03                       
2 ROA 
1998 0.04 0.00                     
2000 0.05 0.04                     
2002 -0.06 -0.04                     
3 Size 
1998 0.14 0.15 0.22                   
2000 0.18 0.12 0.28                   
2002 0.18 0.08 0.23                   
4 CGI-1 
1998 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.46                 
2000 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.53                 
2002 0.18 -0.04 0.26 0.53                 
5 CGI-2 
1998 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.30 0.23               
2000 0.18 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.24               
2002 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.41 0.34               
6 CGI-3 
1998 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.09             
2000 0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.13             
2002 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.19             
7 CGI-4 
1998 0.58 -0.05 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.09 -0.08           
2000 0.56 0.15 -0.04 0.19 0.22 0.14 -0.03           
2002 0.57 0.06 -0.02 0.23 0.27 0.23 -0.04           
8 CGI 
1998 0.37 0.03 0.20 0.48 0.63 0.70 0.36 0.54         
2000 0.42 0.12 0.15 0.48 0.59 0.74 0.38 0.56         
2002 0.40 0.04 0.18 0.52 0.66 0.78 0.40 0.60         
9 Previ 
1998 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.12 -0.03 0.16 0.18       
2000 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.16 0.08 -0.03 0.17 0.17       
2002 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.18       
10 Petros 
1998 0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.19 0.08 -0.05 0.16 0.17 0.43     
2000 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.15 0.36     
2002 0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.00 -0.10 0.14 0.08 0.36     
11 INST 
1998 0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.09 0.13   
2000 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.08 -0.05 0.17 0.10 0.17   
2002 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.07 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.17   
12 NM 
1998 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2000 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2002 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.34 0.32 0.22 0.01 0.34 0.37 0.11 0.02 0.01 
Source: InfoInvest, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and own calculations. All variables were defined in 





Petros is present in a few companies as a relevant shareholder and its dummy is 
highly correlated with the Previ dummy. By and large, its relevant shareholdings were a 
subset of those of Previ. Thus, the analysis of Table 5 considered only the presence of Previ 
as a relevant shareholder. It also considers if an institutional investor is the largest 
shareholder. Table 5 shows the differences in means in the scores of the CGI and its sub-
indices. The statistics reported in Table 5 refer only to 2002. The results for 1998 and 
2000 are the same in terms of significance and are available upon request.  
 












CGI No 180 10.2 1.31 
 Yes 34 11.5  
CGI-1 Disclosure No 180 3.7 0.67 
 Yes 34 4.4  
CGI-2 Board Composition and 
Functioning 
No 180 2.2 0.17 
 Yes 34 2.3  
CGI-3 Ethics and Conflicts of Interest No 180 2.6 -0.03 
 Yes 34 2.5  
CGI-4 Shareholder Rights No 180 1.8 0.50 
 Yes 34 2.3  









CGI No 195 10.3 1.12 
 Yes 19 11.4  
CGI-1 Disclosure No 195 3.8 0.20 
 Yes 19 4.0  
CGI-2 Board Composition and 
Functioning 
No 195 2.1 0.84 
 Yes 19 2.9  
CGI-3 Ethics and Conflicts of Interest No 195 2.5 0.20 
 Yes 19 2.0  
CGI-4 Shareholder Rights No 195 1.9 -0.12 
 Yes 19 1.7  
Source: InfoInvest, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and own calculations. All variables were defined in 
Table 1. Figures in bold are significant at the five percent level.   
 
The results in Table 5 suggest that the average corporate governance scores of the 
companies with a relevant participation of Previ and of those that have an institutional 
shareholder as their largest investor are significantly higher. The same is true for the 
Disclosure and Shareholder Rights sub-indices, but not for the Board Composition and 
Functioning and the Ethics and Conflict of Interest sub-indices. Thus, if present, the impact 
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of relevant shareholding by large institutional investors is not uniform across all corporate 
governance dimensions. It may well be that institutional investors may have no impact at 
all, and that they may simply select companies that are larger, more liquid, and with better 
past profitability, which also present a positive correlation with the corporate governance 
scores. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that institutional investors do not seem to 
select companies that score higher in board composition and functioning and that better 
address potential for conflicts of interest. 
Table 6 presents the results of our regression models for 2002, even though the 
correlation results reported above render them unreliable. The results for 1998 and 2000 
are qualitatively the same and are available upon request. The coefficients for the Previ 
dummy are not significant and their signs are not consistent across all corporate 
governance scores used as dependent variables. The same occurs for the dummy of an 
institutional investor as the largest shareholder. The coefficient for the percent share of 
Previ in the equity capital of companies is not significant as well. There is no evidence from 
Table 6 that suggests that an additional causality analysis should be performed for 
institutional ownership. Thus, we do not provide any additional tests to account for self-
selection and endogeneity. The significant results for some of the control variables, such as 
size, the ROA, and the shareholders agreement and premium listing dummies are 
consistent with those found by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and Silveira et alli 
(2009). The positive coefficients for the shareholders agreement dummy is not surprising 
given that Sternberg et alli (2011) indicated that they are more common among 
companies listed in the premium lists because they have more dispersed ownership.  
 


















Constant 2.04 0.39 -1.56 2.14 1.07 1.93 2.09 0.29 -1.33 2.20 0.94 
Previ 0.15 0.27 -0.27 -0.08 0.22 – – – – – – 
Previ% – – – – – -0.01 – – – – – 
INST – – – – – – 0.55 -0.03 0.64 0.17 -0.22 
Size 0.54 0.23 0.25 0.03 0.03 0.54 0.53 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.04 
ROA 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AGR 1.97 0.20 0.34 0.09 1.34 2.01 1.97 0.22 0.31 0.08 1.37 
NM 1.49 0.47 0.32 -0.02 0.71 1.49 1.50 0.48 0.32 -0.02 0.72 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.33 0.18 -0.02 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.33 0.20 -0.02 0.39 
Source: InfoInvest, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) and own calculations. The dependent variables are in 
the top row and the "explanatory" variables in the first column. All variables were defined in Table 1. Figures 




4 – FINAL REMARKS 
 
Our results are consistent with those of Punsuvo et alli (2007) and Silveira et alli 
(2008), among others that have examined the impact of shareholding by institutional 
investors on corporate governance practices in Brazil. We provide no evidence of a 
potential impact of these investors in general, and of the two largest Brazilian pension 
funds, Previ and Petros, in particular, on the corporate governance scores of the 
companies they invest. We also detected that institutional investors do not seem to select 
companies that score higher in board composition and functioning and that address 
potential for conflicts of interest better. 
A number of things could be happening. First of all, our corporate governance 
scores may not be refined enough to capture the influence of these investors or, 
alternatively, their influence is only felt over a longer time frame. Our corporate 
governance scores capture the presence or absence of certain practices that are reported 
in public documents and, thus, cannot ascertain many aspects of the quality of the 
corporate governance practices of a company, nor can it say anything about the quality of 
the practices it detects. Our scores, however, are highly correlated with listing in Bovespa 
premium listing segments and with company size. It is reasonable to expect that larger 
companies would have the means and incentives to pursue better corporate governance 
practices. 
On the other hand, it is quite possible that Previ and Petros prefer to have their 
more relevant shareholdings in companies that are larger and that showed higher past 
profitability, which also happen to be the ones with greater corporate governance scores. 
Thus, it could well be that all of these variables are endogenous and that Previ and Petros, 
as well as other institutional investors, regard liquidity as a key characteristic their investees 
should have. Finally, it is quite possible that these two very large pension funds represent 
the interests of the incumbent Brazilian government regarding its economic policies and 
political views. Those appointed to represent Previ and Petros at company boards may be 
committed to these political and economic directives, which may or may not be consistent 
with corporate governance practices commonly regarded as good. If this is the case, then 
the impact of any relevant shareholding of these pension funds could have on the quality 
of the corporate governance of their investee firms might not be detected. It is certain that 
more research is needed about this topic, but so far the literature has not identified any 
consistent results about the positive impact of the larger Brazilian pension funds on the 
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